The Electronic Frontier Foundation has made this easy and clear. Please see their site.
Here is an excerpt:
In our study of 20 participants, grouped into 10 pairs of participants who attempted to exchange encrypted email, only one pair was able to successfully complete the assigned tasks using Mailvelope. All other participants were unable to complete the assigned task in the one hour allotted to the study. This demonstrates that encrypting email with PGP, as implemented in Mailvelope, is still unusable for the masses.
Strictly speaking, putting a label on classified information does not protect it. In fact, the appearance of protection may be one part of the problem–unless the label and the efficacious protection were to go together. As a theoretical construct, such a system looks doable.
Make the container match the level of classification. Labels with different colors do not actually protect anything. The strength of the container should be consonant with the level of classification of the information inside, and it could have other important features such as tracking who saw it, where it was, when it was viewed, etc.
In the case of paper, instead of merely having a file on a desk, one could have a file that is a container which offers protection and also records metadata. It might look like a file, but it is more secure: papers won’t fall out, the location of the file could be tracked easily.
Containers could be physical or electronic, and one could make them work together.
Many security products promise the moon and stars with ridiculous statements such as “stop hackers” and “100% safe”–which are misleading at best and often downright lies at worst. No one likes to be uncomfortable, but the truth is very uncomfortable indeed: there is no such thing as absolute security on the internet.
Kleptography is the new reality, and kleptotrojans in random number generators/compilers/key generators are a lethal threat. Getting on the internet means being open to the delivery of kleptographic tools. Almost as bad, we now have the internet of things, another series of threats. What is the solution? For the information that you want to keep private, you must go off-line. If your life depends on it, air gapping is the only solution.
But there is strong security and near-absolute security for information which is not so serious. We can have a high expectation of privacy, anonymity, or both, with good products.
Using a product such as Protonmail for your email provider is an instance of strong security for privacy. Encrypting a file off-line with a symmetric cipher such as CAMELLIA256 and hashing it with SHA512, and sending that over Protonmail would be even better. Using a one-time pad, encrypting it with an appropriate public key or a symmetric cipher, and sending that over an end-to-end encrypted provider like Protonmail is near-absolute security. Done properly, that message will remain unter vier Augen, and will have never really existed once the key to the one-time pad is destroyed.
That said, one must be careful to be aware and to follow the laws that apply to cryptography in your area. For example, in Thailand it is illegal to destroy keys. In Thailand, you can use symmetric keys, but keep a copy because that is the law.
Yes, you can use numbers as a one-time-pad key. In fact, the CIA used to do it all the time, as did many.
When you use numbers the plaintext becomes letters by referring to a conversion table such as the venerable “Tapir” used by the STASI.
Here the addition will be modulo 10. Vernam Cipher, or the one-time pad (OTP), can also be done modulo 2:
message: 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 … pad: 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 … XOR ————————— cipher: 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 …
cipher: 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 … pad: 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 … XOR ————————— message: 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 …
Or it can be done modulo 26 (with English letters, for example):
Plaintext: DARLING THE NIST CURVES HAVE BEEN COMPROMISED AND MY RANDOM NUMBER GENERATOR HAS A KLEPTOGRAPHIC BACKDOOR I FEEL SAD
Key: NLQVT ZBOFW MFAVS RJMDE PGNEX GGQMU VOFNE PBWXT ICDWK VEEYL EGVWS ZRDKD IDJGO HWKFF MBEGA KEUNQ BEYDO
Ciphertext: QLHGB MHHMA ZNSOU LAHHW WGIIY KKDOI HDWBQ XTAAT VFPUB VRHMX RAHXW QXHXH ZDCUF OWCFP XFTZO QVUCX JGZDQ MUYBN VQUZE RBR
Here is one example of what a CIA one-time-pad key looked like during the Cold War:
A new campaign in the crypto wars is now afoot. Today, if you have read the international news, you know that Great Britain, Russia, and China have all made some kind of announcement about the dangers of VPNs and end-to-end encryption. Your privacy has now been put on notice.
The British Foreign minister says that no one needs strong encryption. She insists that it only benefits bad people such as terrorists. Bullocks.
Well, if Great Britain had the guts to expel Jihadists, and if it were not so namby-pamby, cotton candy as to actually finance people living in their country who hate Great Britain and its values, that would go a long way towards making their country safer.
Take the Manchester bomber for example: the British government facilitated a terror attack on British soil. Talk about astonishing! It challenges belief. So you hate Great Britain, have dropped out of college, and you want to go to Libya for some Jihadist training? Need some money? Here you go! We simply can’t wait for you to come back!
As far as Air Strip One goes (Orwell’s name for it in 1984), INGSOC is not yet running the show. Some buffoons are in charge, yes, and they should not be allowed to make slaves out of the whole population.
Free people deserve the right to use encryption and have privacy. The government in Great Britain has failed miserably in allowing jihadists to live and thrive in their country, and they have ignored many hate-filled rants from people who later killed others on British soil. What is therefore the reasonable conclusion to this appalling situation being allowed to exist and fester? The only reasonable conclusion is that their government simply does not care. Equality at all costs.
The Brits need to first expel the nutcases who have openly spoken against their country and the West. That would be a good start.
But there is an enormous fallacy about E2E systems. Yes, Protonmail is very nice, but I would not bet my life on it. First, of course, it does nothing for your anonymity. You still leave a trail of metadata (metacontent). But, for the average user, Protonmail or Tutanota will serve you well because it does give you a high expectation of privacy. Just remember one thing: these email systems do not supply absolute privacy because the end points (the iPhone, computer, smartphone, etc., are not securable).
The only way to get near-absolute security (NAS) is to encrypt offline on an air-gapped computer that is never compromised (no movement of USBs or discs, etc., from anything that has touched the internet). Then use you Protonmai, Hushmail, Tutanota, etc., as a wrapper.
Anyone on the earth can take a pencil, a piece of paper, and two dice, and make a code that no one else on earth can break. This is what should give human beings hope against any future INGSOC and its cronies. Unweakened PGP probably still works with large key sizes and proper variables, etc. Wrapping different kinds of PGP inside other kinds, and using symmetric systems and asymmetric systems together, is highly recommended for someone who wants real privacy: a lawyer, a business negotiator, a clergyman, someone in law enforcement, someone running for office, etc. The amazing truth is that national-level players and sophisticated criminals can be stopped with simple, cheap encryption and true air-gapping. Real defense works, and it is cheap.
Those of us who still live in free societies must stand up for our rights as patriots and law-abiding citizens. Just because governments fail appallingly on the issues of controlling classified information (the OPM disaster, Snowden, Shadow Brokers, etc.) and controlling immigration (Germany in particular, Belgistan, etc.), does not mean that we must accept the numbskulls of INGSOC and the enablers of the West’s decline who want to take away the God-given freedoms of decent people.
People like Amber Rudd need to be run out of town because they are doing nothing effective against the real problems of creating terrorists, facilitating terror, and not controlling immigration.
From Xudong Zheng, a Web application developer:
“Punycode makes it possible to register domains with foreign characters. It works by converting individual domain label to an alternative format using only ASCII characters. For example, the domain “xn--s7y.co” is equivalent to “短.co”.
From a security perspective, Unicode domains can be problematic because many Unicode characters are difficult to distinguish from common ASCII characters. It is possible to register domains such as “xn--pple-43d.com”, which is equivalent to “аpple.com”. It may not be obvious at first glance, but “аpple.com” uses the Cyrillic “а” (U+0430) rather than the ASCII “a” (U+0061). This is known as a homograph attack.
Fortunately modern browsers have mechanisms in place to limit IDN homograph attacks. The page IDN in Google Chrome highlights the conditions under which an IDN is displayed in its native Unicode form. Generally speaking, the Unicode form will be hidden if a domain label contains characters from multiple different languages. The “аpple.com” domain as described above will appear in its Punycode form as “xn--pple-43d.com” to limit confusion with the real “apple.com”.
The homograph protection mechanism in Chrome, Firefox, and Opera unfortunately fails if every characters is replaced with a similar character from a single foreign language. The domain “аррӏе.com”, registered as “xn--80ak6aa92e.com”, bypasses the filter by only using Cyrillic characters. You can check this out yourself in the proof-of-concept using Chrome, Firefox, or Opera.
Visually, the two domains are indistinguishable due to the font used by Chrome and Firefox. As a result, it becomes impossible to identify the site as fraudulent without carefully inspecting the site’s URL or SSL certificate. This Go program nicely demonstrates the difference between the two sets of characters. Safari, along with several less mainstream browsers are fortunately not vulnerable.”
Veracrypt does good work, and they have excellent documentation. Their discussion of their cascading ciphers shown below.
Cascades of ciphers
Two ciphers in a cascade [15, 16] operating in XTS mode (see the section Modes of Operation). Each 128-bit block is first encrypted with Twofish (256-bit key) in XTS mode and then with AES (256-bit key) in XTS mode. Each of the cascaded ciphers uses its own key. All encryption keys are mutually independent (note that header keys are independent too, even though they are derived from a single password – see Header Key Derivation, Salt, and Iteration Count). See above for information on the individual cascaded ciphers.
Three ciphers in a cascade [15, 16] operating in XTS mode (see the section Modes of Operation). Each 128-bit block is first encrypted with Serpent (256-bit key) in XTS mode, then with Twofish (256-bit key) in XTS mode, and finally with AES (256-bit key) in XTS mode. Each of the cascaded ciphers uses its own key. All encryption keys are mutually independent (note that header keys are independent too, even though they are derived from a single password – see the section Header Key Derivation, Salt, and Iteration Count). See above for information on the individual cascaded ciphers.
Two ciphers in a cascade [15, 16] operating in XTS mode (see the section Modes of Operation). Each 128-bit block is first encrypted with AES (256-bit key) in XTS mode and then with Serpent (256-bit key) in XTS mode. Each of the cascaded ciphers uses its own key. All encryption keys are mutually independent (note that header keys are independent too, even though they are derived from a single password – see the section Header Key Derivation, Salt, and Iteration Count). See above for information on the individual cascaded ciphers.
Three ciphers in a cascade [15, 16] operating in XTS mode (see the section Modes of Operation). Each 128-bit block is first encrypted with AES (256-bit key) in XTS mode, then with Twofish (256- bit key) in XTS mode, and finally with Serpent (256-bit key) in XTS mode. Each of the cascaded ciphers uses its own key. All encryption keys are mutually independent (note that header keys are independent too, even though they are derived from a single password – see the section Header Key Derivation, Salt, and Iteration Count). See above for information on the individual cascaded ciphers.
Two ciphers in a cascade [15, 16] operating in XTS mode (see the section Modes of Operation). Each 128-bit block is first encrypted with Serpent (256-bit key) in XTS mode and then with Twofish (256-bit key) in XTS mode. Each of the cascaded ciphers uses its own key. All encryption keys are mutually independent (note that header keys are independent too, even though they are derived from a single password – see the section Header Key Derivation, Salt, and Iteration Count). See above for information on the individual cascaded ciphers.
Here is an important article for people who are concerned about their ISP spying upon them:
Use Windows? You have to be joking.
If the end points are not secure, it does not matter how pretty the code is or how strong the cryptographic primitives are. So what is the use of pretending to offer people real privacy?
These people need to start over and get away from the iPhone and from Android as the places to encrypt and decrypt.
Yes, Signal has done impressive work, they have been repeatedly recommended by Snowden, and we even hear, from illegally-disclosed NSA documents, that the NSA regarded Signal as a major threat in 2012. From those same documents we learned that TAILS, TOR, and TrueCrypt were regarded as even more dangerous, as catastrophic. So why the difference in threat level? What is the difference between “major threat” and “catastrophic”? Isn’t it reasonable to guess that the difference is between subvertible and we-can’t-own-it? In other words, if it were an inaccessible system to the U.S. in its actual employment, I think we would be hearing the FBI scream.
If you are going to take a vacation in Thailand, you need to think about safety. Thailand can be incredibly dangerous. It is good to be aware of the safety issues before you go.
Websites such as Tripadvisor are very happy to encourage you to travel to exotic locations, but the problem is that they may not be eager to tell you about certain problems, such as bombings and the number of people who get hurt or killed for one reason or another at an exotic tourist spot. Pattani is a particularly dicey place to visit because there have been several bombings there. Don’t expect Tripadvisor to discourage you from spending your money with them on a wonderful trip to Pattani.
On May 9th, two bombs went off in a Big-C in Pattani and 56 people were injured. These attacks occur often in the south, but they are less frequent around Bangkok.
The extreme south of Thailand is in the grip of a Muslim insurgency, and there are a lot of killings, even in broad daylight. Vacationing in the extreme south is out of the question.
As far as Thailand goes, I have never met anyone else who has traveled so much across that country. I have done that because I want to write a book about Thailand—its history, its art, its society, its regions. I started this task in 1997, and I made over thirty trips from overseas before I decided to live here.
Thailand can be very dangerous, and a lot of people make a one-way trip. My intention is not to scare people, but I want to be clear about the threats. The point is that a cascade of problems can overtake the unaware tourist, and that is usually how a one-way trip results.
Thailand has the second-most dangerous highways in the world. Poor road maintenance; poor police supervision; slow, non-professional emergency services; people driving with a fake license that cost them 200 Baht; widespread use of drugs and alcohol; bad, or completely fake, medical care; and a devil-may-care attitude about safety—these all add up to a scary situation. After seeing several foreigners get severely hurt and others pass away due to accidents, I decided that I must say something. The roads are out of control in Thailand, and excessive alcohol consumption is fueling an incredible problem.
It seems that a lot of tourists die from drowning, from being attacked while isolated, and from falling through roofs. Why in the world people want to walk on a roof while drunk is beyond me, but a lot of people seem to do this and pay the price.
There are a lot of suicides in Thailand, especially in Pattaya. Pattaya is a center of international crime, and if you go there you are taking a huge risk. Read the local news in Pattaya if you are thinking of going there. Every violent crime in the book, every scam, they are all there.
If you are from a developed country, you take certain things for granted, such as the safety of electrical devices, chairs, lights, etc. In Thailand, you need to be careful. Exposed wiring, unsafe fans, electrocution, and falling over from an unsafe chair, are just examples of what can go wrong. I know of a man who just passed away because his chair collapsed and he hit his head on the stone floor. The safety of everyday objects is not what it should be in Thailand. Exposed wiring and electrocution are real problems.
Rabies is a problem too. Thailand is the third-worst place in the world for rabies. If a dog bites you, clean the wound immediately and go to a hospital for the prophylaxis. Do not wait.
Information security is also an issue. Rootkits are common in Thailand, ones that allow for remote terminal access with root priviledges onto your device. Whatever else you do, don’t purchase pirated software because it often comes with crimeware buried inside. Patriot COMSEC has found crimeware inside pirated Windows 7 versions. Buying pirated software is just not worth it.
You can enjoy yourself in Thailand, but you have to keep control of yourself and be aware that the Thais are not good at safety. They are very good at having fun and taking it easy, but not so good at driving, giving real medical care, doing emergency services, repairing airplanes, or warning people of danger.
Before you buy that ticket for a Thai airline, get on the internet and check out the ICAO safety rating of your prospective airline. Some Thai air carriers are unsafe.
When a tourist gets killed in Thailand the locals look at the event and wonder what the toursit must have done wrong in his or her past lives. That is how insoluble the safety problem is in Thailand. Thais don’t like to talk about bad things; they do not like to speak about things that can kill you. In fact, they think that talking about something bad will make it happen. It is all smiles. And that tourst who just got attacked, hurt, or killed, in the same place that you are thinking of going—do you think the local Thais are going to tell you about it, warn you?
The party atmosphere that is common to tourist areas creates situations that can result in people not coming home, and this is the worst problem. Yes, enjoy yourself, but keep your head clear and do not think that you are visiting the safest place on the planet. You cannot expect Thais to care about safety as most societies do in fully-developed countries.